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IMPLEMENTATION AND THE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM:  A 
PRESSURE PARTICIPANT PERSPECTIVE 
 
This article has two aims: to qualify the UK government’s ‘problem’ of governance in a 
comparison with Scotland and Wales, and to use implementation studies (the ancestors of 
the new governance literature) to explore policy developments since devolution in 
Britain.  It presents a puzzling finding from extensive interview research: that while we 
may expect UK government policy to suffer a bigger ‘implementation gap’ based on 
distinctive governance problems (such as greater service delivery fragmentation and the 
unintended consequences of top-down policy styles), pressure participants in Scotland 
and Wales are more likely to report implementation failures.  Using a ‘top-down’ 
framework, it explores three main explanations for this finding: that the size of the 
implementation gap in England is exaggerated by a focus on particular governance 
problems; that pressure participant dissatisfaction follows unrealistic expectations in the 
devolved territories; and that the UK government undermines devolved policy 
implementation, by retaining control of key policy instruments and setting the agenda on 
measures of implementation success. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of implementation enjoys periodic revivals, with suspicion among its 
proponents that it lives on in the new alias of governance (Barrett, 2004: 254; Exworthy 
and Powell, 2004: 263; Hill and Hupe, 2002; O’Toole Jr., 2000: 276; Saetren, 2005: 572).  
Yet, while the term ‘governance’ has risen in popularity, the intractable top-down versus 
bottom-up debate contributed to the demise of implementation as a widely used concept.   
In this light, is there a valid reason to make the links between old implementation and 
new governance?  The value of these links from the ‘bottom-up’ is demonstrated well by 
Hupe and Hill’s (2007) discussion of the accountability of ‘street level’ bureaucrats 
(Lipsky, 1980) in an era of multi-level governance.  The aim of this article is to highlight 
links from the ‘top-down’.  It focuses on strands of the implementation and governance 
literatures which characterise diminishing central control as a problem.  This literature 
describes the gap between expectations at the top and perceived policy outcomes at the 
bottom (the ‘implementation gap’) and explores the normative problem of ensuring that 
policies made by elected governments are carried out by subordinate authorities such as 
local governments and delivery agencies
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 (Hill and Hupe, 2002).  To outline these issues, 
the article compares the UK
2
 policy process with the experience of the devolved 
governments in Scotland and Wales.   It then draws on extensive interview data to 
explore the perceived ‘success’ of policies in each country. 
 
The primary advantage to this comparison is that it enables us to explore policy 
developments in political systems which appear to suffer fewer problems of governance.  
In Scotland and Wales there is less evidence of a fragmentation of service delivery 
organisations or the same unintended consequences associated with the pursuit of a top-
down policy style.  If such factors are used to explain the implementation gap in England, 
then we would expect to find fewer problems in Scotland and Wales.  In this light, the 
findings from a series of interviews with ‘pressure participants’ (or policy influencing 
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organisations such as interest groups – Jordan, Halpin and Maloney, 2004) and decision-
makers are surprising.   This interview data did not confirm a smoother and more 
successful delivery process in Scotland and Wales.  Rather, respondents were more likely 
to suggest that Scottish and Welsh governments suffer greater implementation problems.  
Therefore a key aim of this article is to account for these puzzling findings, exploring:  
 
 The potential for the new governance literature to exaggerate problems of 
implementation in England. 
 The links between a perception of failure and the unrealistic expectations of 
pressure participants.  
 The attitudes of each government to the implementation process. 
 The influence that the UK government has on the implementation of devolved 
policies. 
 
A further benefit of this comparison within Britain is that the identification of a 
significant ‘implementation gap’ in Scotland and Wales allows us to gauge the level of 
policy divergence since devolution in a way not yet found in the literature. Although 
much of the literature challenges the idea of radical policy change, there is still a focus on 
a series of headline-grabbing policies that set the devolved territories on a different path 
(see Adams and Schmueker, 2005; Trench, 2005; Keating, 2005; Keating, Stevenson, 
Cairney and Taylor, 2003; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008).  A focus on implementation 
problems demonstrates that policy did not diverge as much as these examples suggest.   
 
GOVERNANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The term ‘governance’ has several meanings and applies to at least two approaches to 
implementation.  For example, governance can be viewed as a problem associated with 
the ‘hollowing out of the state’ and the lack of powers at the centre to achieve 
government policy (Rhodes, 1997: 53).  This resembles the top-down approach to 
implementation which identifies the conditions for policy success and explains failure 
with reference to these requirements not being met: 
 
1. There is an understanding of clear and consistent policy objectives; 
2. The policy will work as intended when implemented; 
3. Tasks are fully specified and communicated to skilful and compliant officials; 
4. The required resources (including political will) are committed to the programme; 
5. Dependency relationships are minimal and support from interest groups is 
maintained; 
6. External, or socioeconomic, conditions do not significantly undermine the process 
(see Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). 
 
In contrast, the portrayal of governance as ‘self-organizing networks’ (Rhodes, 1997: 50) 
resembles a bottom-up approach which charts the implementation of policy through self-
selecting clusters of organizations in which a variety of public and private organizations 
cooperate.  In this vein, Barrett and Fudge (1981) criticise a focus on success and failure 
and point to the inevitable problems that governments face when they pursue a top-down 
mode of decision-making.    While central government policy may be the main influence, 
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it competes with a variety of demands (including contradictory government policies) and 
competing pressures within local implementing organisations.  The notion of policy 
failure is criticised because: (a) departments are made up of more than one programme, 
and hence intra-departmental conflict may occur; and (b) few policies are fully 
implemented by one organization (Hjern, 1981; Hjern and Porter, 1982).  It is difficult to 
force decisions on actors within the implementation structure who are employed by other 
organizations, so it is unrealistic to think that a sole central actor could secure its own 
aims and objectives irrespective of the actions of the others involved.  Inattention to the 
complexity of these implementation clusters causes difficulties in the administration of 
policy.  Hence, the exaggeration of policy ‘failure’, as difficulties lead to feelings of 
powerlessness since no one seems to be in charge.  This circular link between top-down 
policy making and feelings of policy failure is central to Bevir and Rhodes’ (2003: 6) 
argument that: ‘centralisation will be confounded by fragmentation and interdependence 
that, in turn, will prompt further bouts of centralisation’ (2003: 6).   
 
Therefore, the governance literature has ties to both bottom-up and top-down approaches.  
This extends to the top-down versus bottom-up debate on the capacity of the centre, its 
ability to control policy and its dependence on others to deliver policy.  Yet, an 
interesting development is that the positions of Marsh and Rhodes have diverged on this 
issue.  When studying the implementation of Thatcherite policies in the UK, Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992) were critical of accounts of implementation which exaggerated the lack of 
power at the top and the degree to which implementation structures were ‘self-selecting’ 
at the bottom.  Yet, many discussions of Rhodes’s hollowing-out thesis now effectively 
characterise it as a bottom-up position. 
 
Many have questioned the ‘hollowing out’ thesis by pointing to the growing range of 
powers that the core executive enjoys, and exploring the extent to which changes at the 
centre have reinforced its power (Hogwood, 1997; Holliday, 2000; Marinetto; 2003).  
Problems of ‘overload’ in the 1970s suggested that the government was never effective at 
controlling peripheral functions of the state.  Governance changes such as privatization 
and civil service reforms mark a return to core competencies, with the centre making 
strategic decisions and creating accountability mechanisms to ensure that these are 
carried out by others.  While this may involve negotiation and the trade of resources, the 
centre is still the most powerful actor and the loss of control described by the hollowing-
out thesis is exaggerated.  Similarly, Marsh et al’s (2003) ‘asymmetric power model’ 
(APM) is critical of the (alleged) assumption of pluralism in Rhodes’ ‘differentiated 
polity model’ (DPM) which highlights, ‘not one but many centres linking many levels of 
government (Rhodes, 1997: 3).  Marsh (2008: 255) argues that ‘strong government, 
although increasingly challenged’ is a more realistic description than the ‘hollowed-out 
state’.     
 
In contrast, Bevir and Rhodes (2003: 6) question the ability of the government to impose 
policies.  While ‘the British executive can act decisively’ and ‘the centre coordinates and 
implements policies as intended at least some of the time’, on the whole, ‘to adopt a 
command operating code builds failure into the design of the policy’.   This builds on 
Lipsky’s (1980) discussion of ‘street level’ implementation which suggests that the focus 
 4 
on the powers of the centre misses the point.  Since public sector professionals are subject 
to an immense range of requirements laid down by regulations at the top, they are 
powerless to implement them all successfully.    Instead, organisations create standard 
operating procedures as a way of satisfying a proportion of central government objectives 
while preserving a sense of professional autonomy necessary to maintain morale.  The 
irony is that this cumulative pressure associated with central government power 
effectively provides them with a degree of freedom to manage their budgets and day-to-
day activities.  
 
There are two paths to choose on the basis of these parallels between governance and 
implementation.  The first is a normative exploration of how much discretion 
implementers should have.  This acted as a polarising force in the top-down versus 
bottom-up debate.  While some stressed the threat to accountability through 
representative government and the loss of ‘certainty and consistency’, others focussed on 
the adaptability to local circumstances, the competition for legitimacy from local elected 
governments (Linder and Peters, 2006: 31) and the willingness of governments to include 
compromises in the policy design (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 71).  These arguments are 
replicated in the governance literature, ranging from Rhodes’ (1997: 54) argument that, 
‘hollowing out erodes accountability’ to Hooghe and Marks’ (2003: 233) suggestion that 
governance should be ‘dispersed across multiple centers of authority’ because, 
‘centralized authority - command and control - has few advocates’ (see also Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2006; Richards, 2007).  
 
The second path is descriptive, with debates regarding how best to explain policy 
‘failure’ and where to study it.  In the UK governance literature, competing models (APM 
and DPM) provide a similar broad narrative of change since the Thatcher period. Rhodes 
(1997) highlights the irony of hollowing out arising (with the exception of the 
Europeanization of policy) as an unintended consequence of Thatcherite attempts to 
present an image of governing competence.  In addition to privatisation and the reduction 
of the public sector, the UK government created contracting-out arrangements and a 
range of quangos to remove delivery functions from local authorities, introduced quasi-
markets in the NHS and separated policy and management functions in the civil service.  
The unintended consequences were service delivery fragmentation, reduced 
communication between senior and junior levels of government and obscured 
accountability (Rhodes, 1994).    
 
A further irony is that while the Labour government recognised these problems it also 
contributed to them – not only by devolving power to UK territories3 and English 
regions, but also by granting independence to the Bank of England, extending the 
influence of the EU through the social chapter, furthering quasi-markets in health, relying 
more on political advisers than civil servants and groups involved in implementation, and 
further fragmenting service delivery with an emphasis on voluntary sector provision of 
public services (Richards and Smith, 2004).  Labour’s first response to the problem of 
governance was the Modernisation agenda on cross-cutting issues, seeking solutions 
based on trust and networks.  This was replaced by a more straightforward top-down 
style in Labour’s second term of office following frustration with a lack of progress on 
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joined-up government at the centre.  Cross-cutting targets coordinated from No.10 were 
transferred to the Treasury and more strongly linked with the control of expenditure 
(2004: 106).   
 
The difference regards how we characterise the effects of these developments. The 
different approaches of APM and DPM mirror the two approaches in implementation 
research – describing the process either as a pyramid with central government at the top 
(following policy along the delivery chain from top to bottom) or as a sphere, with the 
street level organisations in the middle (suggesting the need to study how they interpret 
their decision-making environments) (Hupe and Hill, 2007: 285; Richards and Smith, 
2006; Bevir and Rhodes, 2006).   
 
The aim of this article is not to seek a resolution to these longstanding debates, 
particularly since each approach is self-fulfilling: a focus on the bottom highlights a 
multiplicity of influences and distance from central government, but misses systematic 
patterns of adherence to targets set at the top; a focus at the top highlights central control 
and meeting targets which relate to a small part of government business, ignoring the 
bulk of government responsibilities which are delivered out of the public spotlight.  
Rather, it adopts a pragmatic approach which treats models as complementary rather than 
contradictory (Linder and Peters, 2006: 28) and draws on a range of ideas on governance 
and implementation when appropriate.  The top-down focus is useful because it allows us 
to situate the new governance problem within a broader implementation framework. It 
also qualifies the literature on devolution which gauges policy divergence according to 
policy choices rather than their effects.  The bottom-up approach is useful to explain 
pressure participant dissatisfaction about the limited involvement of devolved 
governments in the implementation process.   The descriptive and normative paths 
highlight the models of decision-making that governments and pressure participants 
choose to gauge the success of policy (since the evaluation of policy is as much political 
as empirical).   
 
GOVERNANCE, IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVOLUTION 
All three countries share ‘hollowing’ elements such as the Europeanization of policy and 
a reduced public sector following privatisation.  They also share implementation 
constraints, such as the need for clear and consistent objectives and to devote significant 
resources to policy.  However, a focus on new governance problems suggests that 
England will face relatively unsuccessful implementation:   
 
1. The fragmentation of service delivery organisations in England makes it difficult 
to control the direction of implementation (Rhodes, 1997).  In Scotland and Wales 
the culture of contracting out was never as strong. In Wales it was often subverted 
(interview, former Chief Executive Swansea Council, 2005).  In Scotland, the 
requirement to contract out 80% of residential care for older people was never 
introduced (interview, UK Department of Health, 2006).  Overall, there is more 
reliance on local authorities, while the devolved governments have taken greater 
control over significant public bodies (such as Communities Scotland and the 
Welsh Development Agency).   In Wales there is a particularly strong 
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commitment to supporting and integrating the public sector and its workforce 
(Welsh Assembly Government, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). 
2. The UK government has adopted a new top-down style to ‘regain control over 
policy outcomes’ (Richards and Smith, 2006: 343).  Organisations must adhere to 
strict targets which cause unintended consequences (Hood, 2007).  The size of the 
English state is large and the monitoring arrangements are remote. In Scotland 
and Wales there are targets but the regime is less punitive and based more on the 
types of personal relationships that can be developed in smaller countries (Laffin, 
2004; interviews, Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, 2004 and 2006;  
Improvement Service, 2006; HMIE, 2006; Welsh Local Government Association, 
2005; Estyn, 2005; Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, 2005). 
3. This top-down approach extends to consultation styles. The policy process in 
Wales and Scotland is arguably more ‘consensual’ and the systematic inclusion of 
pressure participants during the formulation process contributes to better policy 
and aids implementation (Entwhistle, 2006).  
 
Yet, the interview evidence did not confirm a smoother and more successful delivery 
process in Scotland and Wales.  Approximately 250 interviews were conducted from 
1999-2007 with a wide range of interest groups (professional, voluntary, business, trade 
union, religious), civil servants and elected officials in England, Scotland and Wales 
(1999-2007) in the ‘most devolved’ policy areas (health, education, local government).4   
These interviews probed: the nature and frequency of links between pressure participants, 
civil servants and ministers; the distinctiveness of policy decisions in the devolved 
territories; and the extent to which participants felt that these decisions were implemented 
successfully.  These pressure participants were more likely to highlight problems of 
implementation in Scotland and Wales.  So how do we explain this puzzling finding? 
 
The primary hypothesis, explored using the top-down framework, suggests that the 
governance literature exaggerates the likelihood of UK government policy failure.  This 
argument may refer to the inappropriate caricature of English governance which focuses 
on strict targets rather than ‘new localism’ and ‘double devolution’ (see Walker, 2007), 
or the high profile disputes between ministers and interest groups rather than more 
consensual relationships within policy communities (Cairney, 2008a; 2007d).  It may also 
suggest that we focus more on the less visible but still significant ‘regulatory state’ in 
Scotland and Wales (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 150).  However, in broader terms it 
suggests that a focus on new governance problems diverts attention from the old 
problems of implementation such as the lack of clarity in objectives or the lack of 
resources behind policy.  Further, although each government may use different delivery 
mechanisms, they all face similar problems of interdependence with, and compliance 
from, implementing bodies. 
 
Skilful and Compliant Officials  
We may assume that the UK government suffers most from top-down implementation 
factors 3 (compliant officials) and 5 (dependency relationships and support from interest 
groups), based on the problems of fragmentation and interdependence exacerbated by 
top-down policy styles.  Yet the differences should be examined rather than assumed.  In 
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Scotland and Wales the relative closeness between senior decision-makers and 
implementing officials enables the greater ability to ‘micromanage’ policy.  Yet, this 
exaggerates the ability of devolved executives to monitor policy networks and quangos 
which operate at arms length.  Neither Scotland nor Wales have developed a department 
which can match the Treasury’s capacity to control funding and monitor targets 
(McGarvey and Cairney, 2008; Cairney, 2006a).   
 
Similarly, we should not overstate the value of a traditional local government 
relationship. Thatcherite attempts to bypass local authorities were based on their 
obstruction of central government objectives (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992).  The devolved 
governments both face constraints to local authority compliance.  In Scotland the best 
example regards the implementation of free personal care for older people (for the policy 
background see the Sutherland Report 1999; Simeon, 2003; Shaw, 2003; Bell and Bowes, 
2006).   The Scottish Government does not implement this policy directly.  Rather, it 
effectively reimburses local authorities for the care they provide or commission.  It is not 
ring-fenced and service provision becomes linked to negotiations on the (in)adequacy of 
the local government settlement.  The consequence for residential care is incomplete 
implementation (see Cairney, 2006b: 73; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008).  First, many 
councils have lengthy waiting lists for people who qualify for care.
 
Second, the funding 
shortfall leads to disputes over the coverage of the payments (e.g. does it cover meal 
preparation?).  Third, local authorities pass on insufficient funds to private providers who 
then make up the shortfall by overcharging on accommodation costs to fund personal 
care.  These issues resurfaced in 2008 when, first, the SNP Government (from May 2007) 
signalled no desire to challenge local authority behaviour and, second, the new 
Sutherland report highlighted a range of problems (see Cairney, 2008b: 13-14; Cairney, 
2008c: 88).  While the main success of FPC has been a significant rise in care at home, 
the evidence suggests that, until recently, British local authorities already subsidised 
home care (although local authority policy varied, many charged an amount equivalent to 
the £40-£60 per week Attendance Allowance benefit paid by the UK Government – 
interview, Director of Social Work, 2004; CERETAS Wales, 2005).  Therefore, for a 
large part of the Scottish population the new policy replicates arrangements already in 
place. ‘Free’ care becomes a lower than expected increase in funding (since the new 
payments of £145 per week replaced rather than supplemented Attendance Allowance), 
with issues of poor quality personal and residential care still similar across Britain 
(interview, Help the Aged, 2006).    
 
In other areas, compromises are often built into implementation to allow local authorities 
to adapt their policies in line with other priorities.  For example, the Labour-led Scottish 
Executive’s (1999-2007) policy on maximum class sizes in schools referred to an overall 
average (in theory allowing classes of 10 and 40 to meet a target of 25), while the SNP 
Government merely provided the funding without ‘ring-fencing’ it (as part of an overall 
strategy to reduce central government control of local authority spending – see Cairney, 
2008d).  The Welsh Assembly Government (hereafter ‘Welsh Government’) has also 
rejected ‘hypothecated’ funding.  It provides local authorities with aims, but rarely tries 
to impose a ranking of those aims.  Rather, it influences local authority behaviour through 
its consultation style, seeking partnerships and creating a sense of policy ownership 
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(Laffin, 2004: 217; Trench and Jarman, 2007: 119; Rawlings, 2003; Welsh Assembly 
Government, 2002; 2004; 2007; interview, WLGA, 2005).   
 
Support from Interest Groups  
The latter point suggests diverging policy styles, with governments in England pursuing 
compliance through targetry in contrast with devolved government reliance on more 
flexible measures backed by consultation and negotiation (Greer and Jarman, 2008).  
Consultation minimises problems of compliance by creating a sense of involvement and 
greater commitment to policy success.  It also allows the government to benefit from the 
practical experience of those consulted (Jordan and Richardson, 1987: 242; Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992).  Yet, Whitehall departments also enjoy these benefits.  While even the 
rejection of consultation during the Thatcher era is debatable (Cairney, 2002), Marsh et al 
(2001) argue that consultation rose significantly under New Labour (i.e. the comparison 
for devolved governments).  This regularity of consultation is often missed twice when 
we focus at the top.  First, most policy is produced by low-ranking civil servants seeking 
information from pressure participants (Page, 2006: 4; Jordan and Maloney, 1997; 
Cairney, 2008a).  Second, the policy styles literature describes consultation during both 
formulation and implementation.  Groups have at least one of two ‘bites at the cherry’: if 
consultation appears to be rejected (by ministers, in a small number of cases) during 
formulation, the process will return to ‘normal’ during implementation (Jordan and 
Richardson, 1982: 3). 
 
The significance of regular consultation with the UK government is confirmed by 
interviews with participants in health, education, local government, children’s and older 
people’s policies.  The British Medical Association and Royal College of Nursing enjoy 
close relationships with the Department of Health at various levels (interviews, 2006); 
most teaching unions enjoy privileged access within the Department for Education and 
Skills in exchange for a formal commitment to the ‘social partnership’ (interviews, 
Association of Teachers and Lecturers; Professional Association of Teachers; 
Association of School and College Leaders, 2006); the Local Government Association 
has a good working relationship with the Department of Communities and Local 
Government (interview, LGA, 2006); and voluntary groups report regular, valuable 
contact with government (interviews, National Council for Voluntary Organisations; 
Help the Aged; NCH, 2006).   Therefore, while many groups express dissatisfaction with 
inflexible targets and excessive centralisation, their response is to accept the principle of 
targetry and attempt to negotiate around the details (interviews, LGA, RCN, and NHS 
Confederation, 2006;  the exception is teaching unions on pupil testing – Cairney, 2008a). 
 
This UK process of consultation is not necessarily ‘inferior’, particularly since the 
benefits of the devolved consultation processes may be exaggerated.  For example, the 
devolved governments do not always consult widely (the British Dental Association 
Scotland was periodically excluded from policy on NHS dentistry – interview, 2006; the 
decision to subsume public bodies within WAG was done with little effective 
consultation – McAllister and Stirbu, 2007: 298; interviews, CBI Wales, IOD Wales, 
FSB Wales, Prospect Wales, 2005).  Further, their greater propensity to maintain close 
relationships with pressure participants may be based as much on a lack of policy 
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capacity and the need to consult as the wish to create a sense of ownership (particularly 
during the early years of devolution) (Keating, 2005; Cairney, 2008a).  Devolved policy 
styles also have their own unintended consequences.  First, the ‘everyone round the table’ 
approach gives equal weight to each pressure participant.  This contradicts the ‘logic of 
consultation’ (Jordan and Maloney, 1997) with the most affected and most directly 
involved in implementation.   For example, in Wales, Shelter Cymru (interview, 2005) 
points to the early influence of homelessness groups which exceeded their expectations, 
based on a low civil service capacity and crowded out local authority representation.  
Second, we may find consultation only when the principles rather than the details of 
policy are discussed.  A classic example in Wales is policy on free prescriptions.  While 
ministers engaged in partnership meetings to discuss the principles of policy, the same 
process was not followed by civil servants examining the details.  This led to serious 
errors in the regulations to stop ‘prescription tourism’ (interviews, Community Pharmacy 
Wales; Royal Pharmaceutical Society in Wales, 2005).  This example signals the 
possibility that Welsh and English groups have different ‘bites at the cherry’: while the 
former may be consulted more during formulation (since its links are often with ministers 
rather than civil servants), the latter may enjoy more fruitful consultation during 
implementation. 
 
Further, the UK consultation process does not necessarily cause the biggest 
implementation gap, because: (a) success relies on a broader range of implementation 
factors; and (b) the UK consultation process shows a remarkable ability to 
compartmentalise issues even when they involve the same participants.  Both factors are 
demonstrated by mental health policy which arguably highlights the most significant 
breakdown of group-government relations in contemporary UK politics. This involved a 
ten-year stand-off between UK ministers and the vast majority of pressure participants 
which united under the Mental Health Alliance to oppose government legislation 
(Cairney, 2007d).   The end-result was a protracted legislative process and the withdrawal 
of many policy proposals.  In contrast, in Scotland, ministers fostered high levels of 
policy ‘ownership’ among stakeholders (interviews, Penumbra, Mental Health 
Foundation Scotland, Scottish Association for Mental Health, National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship Scotland, 2006).   This was harnessed during the implementation process, 
with the requirement in the Mental Health Act for health and local authorities to 
cooperate supplemented by delivery structures (community health partnerships) less 
subject to top-down controls and blessed with more stability than in England.  Problems 
of compliance were minimised, dependency relationships were managed through stable 
partnerships and the political will was significant (Cairney, 2007c: 77-80; interviews, 
Mental Welfare Commission, Head of Scottish Executive Mental Health Division, 2006).   
 
Yet, the experience in Wales highlights a poor service delivery record despite consensual 
policy styles and less fragmented service delivery mechanisms.  Interviewees (Hafal, July 
2006; Mind Cymru, July 2006) point to close links with health ministers and a 
partnership approach to develop Wales’ National Service Framework (NSF), but also a 
lack of resources and political drive.  Further, problems in Wales resulted from measures 
to integrate services.  Service delivery now flows through 22 small local health boards 
which were introduced to share coterminous boundaries with local authorities.  As a 
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result, the expertise required to commission specialist services is spread too thin and the 
reduced scope for economies of scale in direct provision often means buying services 
from England.  In contrast, the UK government’s relatively top-down and prescriptive 
NSF has faced fewer implementation problems (at least before the NHS funding crisis of 
2006), in part because consultation was more participative and less confrontational than 
the parallel process on legislative reform (interviews, Mental Health Alliance, 2006).   
 
Unrealistic Expectations and Bottom-up Implementation 
Interest groups are not impartial observers of the policy process and their evaluations of 
policy success are linked to their expectations.  Indeed, groups may exaggerate their 
expectations and demands when bargaining with government.  Therefore, their apparent 
dissatisfaction with policy outcomes may exaggerate their lack of influence (Dür and de 
Bièvre, 2007).  This point applies to groups UK-wide.  However, there is good reason to 
expect further group disenchantment in Scotland and Wales which is not explained by 
bargaining strategies. A potential irony of the devolved solution to compliance and 
interest group support is that it exacerbates pressure participant dissatisfaction.  If we 
define the implementation gap as the gap between expectations at the top and perceived 
policy outcomes at the bottom (Hill and Hupe, 2002), then in Scotland and Wales there is 
a bigger gap because there were greater expectations!  These are associated with the term 
‘new politics’ (see McAllister, 2000; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008) and were fuelled by 
three factors: 
 
1. Many policies were sold as a significant break from UK policy and associated 
with terms (e.g. ‘free’ rather than ‘subsidised’ personal care; the ‘abolition’ of 
student fees) that exaggerated their scope.   
2. Devolved administrations fostered their own policy networks, giving the 
impression that their governments were the key decision-makers rather than part 
of a multi-level governance process. 
3. Scottish and Welsh consultation fosters high levels of ‘ownership’ and 
participants count on policy to be implemented according to agreements reached 
at the top.     
 
Therefore, Scottish and Welsh participants are more likely to express dissatisfaction if 
compromises with implementing bodies are built into the policy design.  Yet, ironically, 
the devolved governments are the most likely to embrace bottom-up methods: 
minimising ring-fencing, deferring to locally defined policy priorities, fostering service-
led improvements, relying on outcome measures (e.g. improvements in quality of life) 
and promising to intervene only if insufficient progress is made (Laffin, 2007; Cairney, 
2007c; interviews, COSLA, 2004 and 2006; Improvement Service, 2006; WLGA, 2005; 
Improvement and Development Agency, 2006; LGA, 2006).  The gap can therefore be 
explained by different attitudes (between pressure participants and devolved 
governments) to implementation styles, and therefore different perceptions of what 
constitutes implementation success. 
 
Devolved participants do not object to a less prescriptive implementation style per se.  
Rather, they lament their inability to influence policy when the centre relinquishes 
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control (interview, One Parent Families Scotland, 2003).  This frustration relates to their 
lack of resources to lobby outside of the central government arena.  Much depends on the 
status of groups before devolution, with devolved arms of UK organisations 
(approximately half of all Scottish groups – Keating, 2005: 65) the most likely to report 
insufficient resources (arguably because their parent organisations have not responded 
sufficiently to devolution – see Cairney, 2008a).  Some may have one member of staff, 
and in Wales some may have less than one!.  This is a problem felt particularly by groups 
in the children’s and older people’s sectors where policy issues extend across 
departments and many levels of government.    In such cases, groups become involved in 
new policy communities, make a meaningful contribution to the formulation process, but 
then see their influence decline as implementation authorities set their own agendas.   
 
These issues are demonstrated well by housing policy.  Both devolved governments 
introduced higher minimum housing standards than England, but this merely produced 
the perception that Scotland and Wales make strategies while England delivers 
(interview, Chartered Institute of Housing, May 2006).  In Wales many local authorities 
did not contain the housing standard in their business plan; in Scotland there were serious 
delays on local authority submissions and civil service assessments of plans to fulfil the 
standards.  In contrast, the UK Government was more focussed on enforcing a lower 
standard and monitoring local authority performance.  Homelessness presents a similar 
picture (interviews, Shelter Scotland, November 2003; Scottish Council for Single 
Homeless, January 2004; Shelter Cymru, July 2005).  Scotland and Wales introduced 
wider definitions of need but did not provide additional ring-fenced funding to match the 
expansion of policy (suggesting more people chasing the same housing).  In Scotland 
groups describe the ‘best homelessness legislation’ but worst social housing conditions in 
Europe (based on the lack of political will to direct local authorities to implement policy). 
In Wales, low civil service capacity and low levels of local authority interest in 
homelessness limited discussions between the Welsh Government and councils at senior 
levels.  This contributed to implementation problems, including the use by local 
authorities of bed and breakfast accommodation for families (against Welsh Government 
policy).   
 
External and Socioeconomic Conditions  
‘External’ factors undermining implementation are felt most in devolved territories for 
several reasons: 
 
1. Socio-economic conditions, such as a relatively ill or more dispersed population, 
are more likely to constrain policy success (Greer, 2004). 
2. ‘Europeanization’ increases the role of the UK (as the member state) in 
monitoring the implementation of policy by devolved governments (Keating, 
2005; Jeffery and Palmer, 2007; Cairney, 2006c).   
3. Devolved governments may be pressured by the UK government to emulate 
decisions made by the UK.  In practice, this depends on whether or not there is a 
shared party of government (with most pressure coming from UK ministers to 
their devolved counterparts) and the attitudes of first ministers.  For example, Jack 
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McConnell appeared more willing to cooperate than Rhodri Morgan (Keating, 
2005; BBC News, 2002). 
4. Devolved policies may be undermined by the reserved aspects of policy and the 
effects of English decisions.   These constraints are most significant in Wales 
which has responsibility for fewer policy areas and lacks the ability to pass 
primary legislation (although the Government of Wales Act 2006 has increased its 
powers significantly – Paun, 2006). Wales is historically tied to policy in, and 
enjoys a fluid cross-border flow of goods and services with, England.  They are 
also felt in Scotland, particularly when Scottish decisions relate to a UK-
controlled tax and benefits regime (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 160).  
Examples include housing, child or fuel poverty, while the unintended 
consequence of free personal care was terminated entitlement to UK Attendance 
Allowance (Scottish entitlement to council tax benefit would also cease if the 
Scottish Government introduced a local income tax).   
 
Although the UK-effect may be felt most in Wales, the attitudes of devolved 
governments are also significant.  For example, although both faced a combination of 
strict Treasury controls on public borrowing and financial incentives to transfer local 
authority housing stocks, the effect was different in each country.  In Scotland there was 
a history of co-operative, tenant and community ownership models of housing and so 
stock transfer did not represent a wholesale break from local authority control.  The 
Scottish Executive (1999-2007) embraced stock transfer as a means of reducing debt and 
increasing investment. In Wales there was a stronger history of local authority control 
and more rhetorical links were made between housing associations and privatisation 
(although tenant votes against transfer have also passed in Scotland).  As a result, the 
Welsh Government has been less enthusiastic, seeking in vain a new policy which 
satisfies Treasury rules.  This may further perceptions of policy failure in Wales 
(interviews, Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 2003; Welsh Housing, 2005; 
National Housing Federation, 2006).  Similarly, Treasury rules on the capital funding of 
schools encouraged Scotland (until the election of the SNP in 2007) but not Wales to 
follow wholeheartedly the English reliance on public-private partnerships (Cairney, 
2006a).  This exaggerates the appearance of policy failure in Wales.  The inability of the 
Welsh Government to pursue alternative funding mechanisms for schools led to 
unfavourable comparisons of working conditions for teachers (interview, ATL, 2006). 
 
The devolved governments also face significant reserved issues in higher education 
(Keating, 2005b: 431) and this affected early policies (2001) on tuition fees.  In Scotland, 
policy divergence was signalled by the promise of an ‘abolition’ of tuition fees (in fact, 
up-front fees were replaced by a smaller ‘endowment’ fee payable after graduation; this 
endowment was abolished by the SNP Government in 2008) but implementation 
problems were built into the policy design.  While a key recommendation of the Cubie 
Report was the repayment of 2% of income at an income level of £25000, this was 
constrained by existing arrangements managed by the Inland Revenue.  The Scottish 
Executive could have set up a separate system for fee collection, but it accepted the UK 
threshold because it could not opt-out of the arrangements for student loan payments 
(now 9% of income over £15000 per year).  Therefore, students still took out loans to 
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cover living expenses and the endowment and were expected to pay this back after 
graduation at the same rate as English students (Cairney, 2006c).  In Wales, the lack of 
legislative power was addressed in 2001 with an imaginative use of finance.  A means-
tested National Bursary Scheme for Welsh residents (including further education and 
part-time students) effectively paid for the up-front element of tuition fees (Rees, 2005). 
 
Perhaps more significantly, both governments have been forced to react to the UK’s 
introduction of top-up fees to supplement the income of English universities.  For 
example, the Scottish Executive planned to charge English medical students studying in 
Scotland, to ward against Scottish students being crowded out (Cairney, 2006d).  In 
Wales, although the tuition fee regime was formally passed to the Welsh Assembly in 
2004, its new power was undermined by cross-border pressures.  Indeed, the ‘Rees 
review’ (Welsh Assembly Government, 2005) concluded that any significant departure 
from English policy would have profound consequences on student and staff movement 
across the border.  Lower fees would mean too many English students studying in Welsh 
universities, while lower investment could cause staff flows in the opposite direction. As 
a result, the Welsh Government recommended following the English lead (although party 
politics caused the National Assembly for Wales to reject this in favour of targeted 
additional grants to Welsh students studying in Wales – interviews, Professor Theresa 
Rees, 2005; Higher Education and Funding Council Wales, 2005).  In both cases, 
decisions made by the UK Government undermined the implementation of policies made 
previously by devolved governments (fee abolition in Scotland and a grants system based 
on equality rather than nationality in Wales).   
 
Setting the Agenda on Success 
Such examples suggest different types of policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 
2000) when devolved policy is driven by the UK government.  The direct use of reserved 
powers suggests ‘coercive transfer’, while devolved policy based on the disproportionate 
effects of UK decisions in Scotland and Wales suggests ‘indirect coercive transfer’: 
policy decisions are taken voluntarily but ‘driven by perceived necessity’ (2000: 13).  A 
further type of indirect coercive transfer relates to changes in devolved policies driven by 
the appearance of UK success.  Since this is unlikely to be based on a long-term analysis 
of policy outcomes (at least while devolution is in its infancy) the appearance of success 
in England is fostered by the use of outputs masquerading as outcomes.  A perception of 
English achievement is based on the UK Government’s ability to set the agenda and 
influence the measurements used to gauge policy success.  Although the issue of 
measurement extends to most areas (see Andrews and Martin, 2007 which attempts to 
give a statistical overview of Welsh and English public service performance), we can see 
this effect most clearly in healthcare policy.   
 
There are many factors which should qualify levels of health policy success:  the effects 
of government policies on overall health improvement are difficult to track (see Alvarez-
Rosete et al, 2005); the surgical operations associated with waiting lists account for a 
very small proportion of NHS spend (Andrews and Martin, 2007: 155); and the perfect 
attainment of targets does not necessarily produce successful outcomes (Hood, 2007).  
Yet, the UK Government often succeeds in equating targetry success with real success in 
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healthcare efficiency.  By extension, attempts by devolved governments to set their own 
agenda with different proxy indicators are often undermined by a public and media focus 
on targets, often fuelled by UK ministers bemoaning the lack of ‘modernisation’ outside 
England.  The dominance of the UK agenda means that devolved government success is 
not measured on its preferred terms (such as patient satisfaction - interview, Welsh 
Government special adviser, 2005).   This is a crucial constraint to policy implementation 
when each government has already taken different policy decisions based on their 
respective strengths: England furthering the managed market approach with a pool of 
experienced NHS managers; Scotland moving towards the pre-internal-market system of 
professional consensus, given its wealth of senior clinicians and Royal Colleges; and 
Wales drawing on close links to local government, focussing on public health and closer 
integration between local authorities and local health boards by introducing coterminous 
boundaries (Greer, 2004).  The effect of the UK agenda on waiting times and waiting lists 
is that the devolved governments generally feel the need to respond and adopt policies 
which no longer play to their strengths. The UK has more resources available for 
implementing policies based on healthcare targets: 
 More ‘new’ money to reduce waiting times following a period of generous 
Treasury allocations to the Department of Health (although the NHS deficit 
crisis in 2006 may now undermine this advantage). While Scotland and Wales 
benefited from this spending increase (via the Barnett formula – see McGarvey 
and Cairney, 2008), the devolved agenda has been more concerned with 
‘streamlining’ services before committing further investment. 
 A more developed ‘command and control’ function, particularly compared to 
Wales which devolved decision-making to NHS Trusts and removed central 
capacity functions under the former Conservative government.  The size of 
commissioning in Wales (22 LHBs) represents a sacrifice of efficiency for 
coterminosity, with expertise spread too thin and a limited ability to challenge 
the Trusts.   
 A bigger pool of senior NHS managers.  In England the punitive regime for 
missed targets was made possible by the ability to threaten chief executives with 
unemployment.  In Scotland and Wales there is less competition for posts and 
less pressure on managers to meet targets.  
 Less inertia based on medical commitment to previous policies, including the 
rejection of ‘marketisation’ and management-led reform in Scotland.  This 
inertia may undermine a sudden insistence by Scottish ministers to devote more 
resources to meet targets that distort clinical priorities. 
Yet, we can qualify this centralising effect in three ways.  First, the effect of the English 
agenda is not felt equally.  In Scotland, there is more control over the presentation of 
success.  For example, while (in September 2005) Tony Blair was publicly critical of the 
rejection of English NHS reforms in Scotland, the Scottish Executive’s Permanent 
Secretary presented evidence suggesting that, ‘we are now doing substantially better than 
England’ (see Cairney, 2006d: 118).  The effect in Wales was best demonstrated when 
Jane Hutt was replaced by Brian Gibbons as Health Minister - a sign that the Welsh 
Government was willing to change tack and play ‘catch-up’ with England (interview, 
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Welsh NHS Federation, 2005).  This reflected stark cross-border comparisons of 
statistics, made more significant by the flow of staff and patients between England and 
Wales.  Yet, Gibbons’ difference in approach has largely been presentational.  For 
example, tackling waiting times by giving the 2
nd
 offer scheme was devised before the 
current minister was in office.  While it appears to follow the English agenda on Patient 
Choice, ‘it is an equity, not choice, based system’ (interview, Welsh Government special 
adviser, 2005).   In England the individual drives the scheme on the assumption that s/he 
is an informed, motivated, articulate consumer.  In Wales the NHS identifies patients and 
negotiates an alternative time and location, with the cost and ability to travel built into the 
calculation.   
 
Second, tobacco policy shows that agenda-setting is not one-way.  The decision to ban 
smoking in public places in Scotland, combined with commitments made in Wales and 
Northern Ireland, acted as a catalyst for change in England (Cairney, 2007a; 2007b).  
Third, this type of indirect coercive transfer related to success may be restricted to areas 
such as health which display very similar starting points, easily comparable results and a 
significant flow of staff and (relatively interested and knowledgeable) consumers.  This 
may contrast with, for example, compulsory education which has always been organized 
differently, particularly in Scotland (this includes the development of its own indicators) 
but also in Wales which has traditionally demonstrated a higher commitment to 
comprehensive schools and a stronger role for local education authorities (interviews, 
General Teaching Council Wales, 2005; GTC Scotland 2006).  Further, the UK agenda 
on performance is less persuasive and subject to greater professional opposition than in 
health, while the flow of staff and students between England and Wales is not as 
significant as health or higher education.   Therefore, Scotland and Wales have been able 
to distance themselves from performance league tables and there is less emphasis on 
testing.   
 
CONCLUSION 
This article explores the idea that the implementation gap will be bigger in England than 
in Scotland and Wales because the UK government faces unique problems: a top-down 
policy style alienates organisations charged with implementation; strict targets have 
unintended consequences; and service delivery fragmentation undermines central control 
(Rhodes, 1997).  These factors are less apparent in the devolved arenas characterized by 
partnership working, a more flexible approach to targets and a closer relationship to 
delivery organisations.  Yet, the interview evidence does not confirm that devolved 
governments suffer fewer problems of implementation.  Indeed, it is possible to present 
an opposing narrative: in healthcare, the agenda is dominated by proxy measures (waiting 
lists and times) that England is better placed to deliver on; in social care, Scotland’s 
flagship policy has not produced a better quality of care for older people; in housing, 
England has delivered more with less; and in education the results are mixed, with 
Scotland and Wales pursuing different agendas in compulsory education but struggling to 
maintain differences in higher education.   
 
A key explanation for this finding is that there is significant potential for the new 
governance literature to exaggerate problems in England and underestimate the 
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implementation gap in Scotland and Wales.
5
  A more extensive discussion of top-down 
implementation factors suggests that each government faces similar problems related to 
interdependence, the compliance of implementing bodies and support from interest 
groups.  For example, England’s confrontational style is often exaggerated and there are 
unintended consequences to devolved policy styles, while dependency relationships with 
local authorities are not necessarily less problematic than with other service delivery 
organisations (particularly when the powers of devolved governments are limited). 
Devolved governments also face additional ‘external’ problems associated with reserved 
powers, the effects of English policies and the failure to challenge UK government 
measures of policy success.  In other words, UK government influence on devolved 
policy does not end with policy formulation.  Indeed, its (often intentional) contribution 
to the devolved implementation gap has undermined policy divergence significantly.   
 
A further explanation for the gap between expectations and perceived policy outcomes 
can be found in the different attitudes of pressure participants and their respective 
governments to the implementation process.  In England, if policy is imposed following 
inadequate consultation then problems with implementation will not be criticised by 
pressure participants.  Rather, they link implementation ‘failures’ to inadequate policies, 
the inflexibility of government targets and excessive levels of centralisation.  In contrast, 
devolved pressure participants count on the policies that they influence and approve to be 
implemented fully.  Yet, ironically, their governments are the least likely to impose 
policies from the top down.  This presents a problem for participants who develop a 
strong ownership of policies formulated at the top, but do not have the resources to 
influence policy implementation at the bottom.   
 
In most discussions of implementation and governance, this problem leads to normative 
debates stressing the inappropriate ability of organisations to subvert democratically 
produced policies from the top-down.  However, in this case the waters are muddied by 
government attitudes.  While pressure participants may bemoan a lack of central control, 
the devolved governments themselves appear to foster bottom-up development as long as 
broad commitments are met.  Compromises are often built into the policy, particularly 
when the same actors (such as local government) are involved in negotiations at the 
formulation and implementation stages.  Although this leads to the intermittent 
appearance of policy failure, it may be preferable to the unintended consequences (most 
visible in England’s focus on targets) of more successful levels of compliance. 
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1
 For the purposes of this article the Scottish and Welsh governments are treated as comparisons rather than 
‘subordinate authorities’.  Each government has its respective subordinate authorities. 
2
 The article uses ‘UK’ to avoid confusion with governing practices in English regions.  The term 
‘England’ refers to UK Government policies for England.   
3
 Although note that the main focus of this article is not the contribution of devolution to the UK 
governance problem.   
4
 The broader project draws on over 300 interviews conducted between 1999-2008.  Two rounds of 
interviews in Scotland were supported by the ESRC’s Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme 
(Keating, 2005).  Interviews in Wales in 2005 and England in 2006 were supported by the University of 
Aberdeen.  Ongoing research in Northern Ireland and England is supported by a Nuffield Small Grant 
(Keating, Cairney and Hepburn, 2008).   
5
 Particularly when we focus on the implementation of new policies which are arguably the least likely to 
succeed.  These represent a ‘high tariff test’ given the limits to resources for new policies and the relative 
lack of information (Bradbury, in correspondence).      
 
